Comments on: The Origins of Political Order: Review of Francis Fukuyama’s impressive history of the state

By: Tomas Bridle

Tomas Bridle — Sun, 02 Aug 2015 23:06:03 +0000

I wish I knew. I guess I share a lot of Fukuyama’s pessimism. Economic growth and globalization seems to have done more to concentrate economic and political power and create coalitions of new and old elites with a common interest in building pliable “isomorphic” institutions that they could control. and suppressing any potential reform. There seems to be a very resilient sweet spot for the late democratizers: you want economic and political institutions just good enough not to set off alarm bells with the internationals, but still pliable enough that you can enrich yourself and your allies, build up your patronage networks, manipulate election results and ensure that judicial decisions come out in your favor. The real key to this system is actually not the political side, but the fact that it discourages any independent economic activity – anyone with entreprenurial ambitions sees more future in emigration – so that you never get that middle class reformist constituency. Opposition is left to aging intellectuals, human rights cranks and if you’re lucky maybe a few courageous young people. Maybe the place to start is not by asking what will drive reform, but by looking at the role we play as donors and the development community – are we thinking about ways to curb that system’s impact and it’s grip on power, at least in the sectors where we’re working? Or are we just going along with it so we hit our project indicators, and pretending that the systemic impact doesn’t matter. If there’s optimism its because that’s become much more a poart of the development discussion now than it used to be.

By: Chris Alford

Chris Alford — Fri, 31 Jul 2015 16:28:04 +0000

Nice review Duncan. I’m on the final chapter of this book (the first tome) – it’s taken me a while to get through, but has been worth the time spent. I found the parts on China and the Ottoman empire’s institution of military slavery the most interesting – it was fascinating to read how such distinct societies devised with similar strategies for dealing with the problem of patrimonialism and it’s threat to state building. Also really enjoyed the part on the role of Christianity in the development of the rule of law, as well as the different political and institutional configurations in Europe that led towards, or not towards, the development of political accountability. Certainly lots of juicy stuff in this book for development today (institution building, thinking & working politicallly strategies, etc.). Will definitely be reading his next volume, but may try something a bit more easy-going for my next read (Cesar Hidalgo’s new book on information, networks and economies looks fascinating so think that one will be next!)

By: Duncan Green

Duncan Green — Thu, 30 Jul 2015 05:29:26 +0000

Great comments Tomas, and I think you’re right – war is looking less useful as a driver of change, and new options are emerging. Fukuyama highlights growth and increasing globalization as two of them. I would add shifting norms on citizenship and rights, and universal literacy. Any others?

By: Tomas Bridle

Tomas Bridle — Wed, 29 Jul 2015 18:28:54 +0000

Seems to me that war today wouldn’t have the same role as driver of change because its a different kind of war. The European wars required mobilizing large numbers of trained men, complex logistical planning, devotion to some conceptual notion of a state and the financial resources to pay for the whole hugely expensive enterprise. All that requires a capable state as Tillly and Fukuyama point out. But the conflicts, violence and “small wars” that are more common today – while they may be equally or even more horrific – is not fought out by states with mass mobilized armies but by smaller specialized units, often not connected with any state or organized as irregular militias whose existence and connections is denied by the sponsoring state (see: Russia in Ukraine) or who belong to shadowy security forces, or by affiliated but mostly autonomous groups organized as networks but with minimal central control. When a state goes to war now its more likely to be against its own citizens, or to defend against those irregulars, who often have some sympathy in the population. Those kinds of wars are more likely to destroy state functionality than build it up. (And of course developed countries fight their wars with professsional soldiers or bombing raids or just use drones… which some would argue is also corrosive to state and social cohesion.)