

Active Citizens and Effective States: Definitions and Interactions: a Critical Review

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Abstract

This critical review explores a central thread in the ideas and publications generated by 25 years of writing and activism - the nature of and interaction between citizens and states in development.

It explores the evolution of these arguments in the works in question, and reviews the literature in separate sections on the validity of the state-citizen framework, the nature of citizenship, the role of the state in development, and state-citizen interaction.

The discussion identifies strengths in the works under review. Despite their overlaps and blurred boundaries, the basic framework of 'active citizens and effective states' has withstood scrutiny and the framework's endogeneity has helped in understanding the internal dynamics and evolution of political, social and economic development.

The review highlights some apparent gaps and weaknesses in the literature, notably the reliance of much of the work on the history of citizenship on the particular experiences of Western Europe and North America; the flimsiness of the discussion of the 'democratic developmental state' and the lack of analysis of 'peacetime' active citizenship in non-democratic contexts, for example rural protest movements in China and Vietnam, or women's rights movements in Islamic societies.

The review also identifies a number of weaknesses in the works under review that need to be addressed in my future research. These include the importance of economic power and structures, the internal structure and dynamics of citizens' movements, the negative roles of some citizens' movements in excluding or attacking other groups of poor people, and the interaction between national and global citizens' movements.

A final section concludes and identifies directions for future research to address these.

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1. Introduction

This review explores a central thread in the ideas and publications generated by 25 years of writing and activism on issues related to international development. During that time I went from being a human rights activist to a journalist, writer and researcher on Latin America, and then joined the development NGO sector as a policy analyst and lobbyist on a range of issues related to globalisation and international trade. In 2004, I became head of research at Oxfam GB, and subsequently wrote a book *From Poverty to Power* (2008), that tried to pull together these different experiences into a single coherent narrative on development. In this review, I will try and identify the strengths and weaknesses of that book's core argument, in light the historical literature on states and citizenship, and identify future directions for research.

The core argument of *From Poverty to Power* is that, in the words of the subtitle, 'active citizens and effective states can change the world.' This review works backwards, tracing the genesis of this formulation in my previous work, and locating the work in the relevant literatures on citizenship, states, and their interaction.

The introduction to *From Poverty to Power* sets out the citizen-state thesis, arguing that social and political change are essentially endogenous:

'Development... is best achieved through a combination of active citizens and effective states. By active citizenship, we mean that combination of rights and obligations that link individuals to the state, including paying taxes, obeying laws, and exercising the full range of political, civil, and social rights. Active citizens use these rights to improve the quality of political or civic life, often through the sort of collective action that historically has allowed poor and excluded groups to make their voices heard.... By effective states, we mean states that can guarantee security and the rule of law, and can design and implement an effective strategy to ensure inclusive economic growth. Effective states, often known as 'developmental states', must be accountable to citizens and able to guarantee their rights. ' (Green, 2008, p. 12)

Looking back over the two decades covered by these works, it is possible to discern a clear, but unfinished trajectory in the evolution of my thinking. *Faces of Latin America* (1991) opens in a continent of embattled popular movements, fighting against elite-controlled governments and an essentially regressive economic system. Heroic defeats are to be expected, albeit punctuated by the occasional often pyrrhic victory. The implicit assumption in this analysis was that economics and economic structures shaped politics, rather than vice versa – structure dominates agency (*Silent Revolution*, 1995; *Chile: The First Latin American Tiger?*, 1995; *Latin America: neoliberal failure and the search for alternatives*, 1996; *A Trip to the Market*, 2001).

By the late 1990s, I had become more involved in trying to understand these economic structures and was beginning to read, and get excited about, the role of the state both as a deliverer of growth and as a potential independent counterweight to domination by both domestic and foreign economic elites. (*Faces of Latin America*, second edition, 1997). I had also broadened my understanding of citizenship beyond national protest movements to wider discussions of human rights (*Hidden Lives*, 1998).

With my move to the development NGO sector in 1997, I began to broaden the geographical remit of my research from an almost exclusive focus on Latin America and the Caribbean, to a wider concern with the developing world. In terms of the publications submitted here, that wider focus begins with an essay on global social movements (*Globalization and its Discontents*, 2002), followed by *From Poverty to Power*. Although the narrative expanded its geographical remit, it remained rooted in the 20th Century (mainly the second half).

Methodology

My research and writing have never pretended to be disinterested. They are part of my work as a ‘practitioner’ – a hybrid researcher, lobbyist and policy analyst - in a range of think tanks, human rights campaigns and development organisations. I seek to set out a progressive narrative, first on contemporary Latin America, and subsequently more generally. Such narratives offer a way of seeing the world, a framework both for

explaining and understanding the origins of pressing development issues, but also for galvanizing and informing activists, students and decision-makers.

The target audience is both in the 'development movement' in the West and progressive movements within developing countries themselves (*From Poverty to Power* was published separately in Uganda, South Africa, India, Brazil and South Korea). Summaries of both *Silent Revolution* and *From Poverty to Power* were published separately to broaden their audience.

This explicitly didactic purpose influences both the content of the works and how they are written. A need to communicate with a wide public imposes the need to minimise the use of technical or difficult language. This risks the loss of an important level of nuance, for example in situating conclusions in their correct geography or time span, rather than presenting them as more universal generalisations. This review offers the chance to engage with the more technical literature and highlight any weaknesses introduced by generalisation. This in turn should improve my ability to integrate both academic and civil society audiences in my future work.

The methodology used in all the works under review involved a combination of literature review and fieldwork in a wide range of developing country contexts. This usually involved short (typically two week) visits for the collection of relevant documents and informal discussion, semi-structured interviews and participant observation in a range of settings, including both people living in poverty (rural communities, squatter settlements etc), decision makers, civil society organisations and academics.

Original Contribution

The main claim to originality of the works under review lies in their attempt to construct a range of synthetic broad narratives, whether on a region (*Faces of Latin America*), an economic process (*Silent Revolution*), an issue such as child rights (*Hidden Lives*) or on development itself (*From Poverty to Power*). As a result several of them (particularly *Faces of Latin America*) have become standard university texts. Particular works have other more specific claims to originality: *Silent Revolution* was the first comprehensive English-language critique of the impact of structural

adjustment and the Washington Consensus in Latin America; *Globalisation and its Discontents* (2002) provide one of the first post-9/11 analyses of the ‘anti-globalisation movement’ (although it disavowed the term); *From Poverty to Power* contains what is possibly the only comprehensive ‘NGO narrative’ on development, contributing to the emergence of a distinctive NGO voice on the issue.

In terms of the theme particularly examined in this review, *From Poverty to Power* brings together and attempts to reconcile two literatures (on states and citizens) that are seldom examined together. The discussion of the interaction between states and citizens is arguably the most original aspect of the book, combining both a partial review of the literature, and the lessons of NGO experiences in advocacy work, often conducted in the interstices between state and citizens’ movements.

Universalism v the Particular

While incorporating insights from environmentalism and feminism, together with post-modernism’s emphasis on fragmented identity (for example social movements based on race, faith and gender, as well as class, in *Faces of Latin America*, chapters 9-11), none of the works under review share the post-development school’s suspicion of universal concepts and narratives (Escobar, 1995). On the contrary, the purpose of *From Poverty to Power* was precisely to offer a broad narrative, offering a more politics- and power-conscious alternative to those provided by a number of aid economists such as Collier (2007) and Sachs (2005).

Such narratives inevitably entail compromises between the need for clarity, and the enormous complexity and specificity of different developmental contexts. Every author faces the challenge of where to locate themselves on this general-specific spectrum. In erring in favour of clear, simple stories, general works like mine risk doing particular violence to complexity and difference. Just one example would be the way generalisations on effective states tend to downplay the importance of non-state institutions in many parts of Africa. On the other hand, part of the purpose of the works reviewed here was to convey a greater understanding of nuance and complexity to an activist audience that often sees the world in excessively simplistic ways. I am most certainly not writing from the simplistic extreme of the spectrum.

In order to blend complex and varied realities into a universal narrative, linguistic precision must also sometimes be sacrificed. Broad notions such as ‘active citizenship’ or ‘effective states’ often become ‘fuzzwords’ (Cornwall 2007, pp 471-484) that are retained in the minds of readers precisely because they can bend them to meet their assumptions and preferences. Greater precision would both deter non-specialist readers, and lose the chance of creating this kind of ‘envelope of meaning’ that, even while being blurred at the edges, can shape thinking and debate. Examples in the wider development debate include ‘fuzzwords’ such as ‘participation’ or ‘empowerment’, or indeed, ‘development’. The use of ‘fuzzwords’ thus deliberately trades off precision for impact on wider debates, especially within the development sector.

One unintended consequence of this pressure for accessibility is that more difficult and innovative subjects are either dropped altogether, or relegated to appendices and footnotes. Two of the most useful sections for this review, *Silent Revolution*’s discussion of neostructuralism, and *From Poverty to Power*’s section on ‘how change happens’ were mainly relegated to annexes.

Generalized accounts run a further risk – that in glossing over complexity and difference, they default back to ‘common sense’ assumptions that are in reality based on the author’s own cultural context, or the mainstream literature, in this case literatures on citizenship that are dominated by the experience of Europe and North America, or on state formation by that of Europe and East Asia. This leaves some notable gaps, such as the role of active citizenship in non-democratic contexts, which are discussed below.

This review first discusses the strengths and weaknesses of adopting the citizen/state framework, then explores concepts and literatures in the works under review. It then explores the broader literature on citizenship, the role of states in development and the interaction between them. A concluding section summarizes the findings of the review and sets out directions for future research.

2. The Active Citizens and Effective States framework

The conceptual framework of active citizens and effective states (ACES) adopted in *From Poverty to Power* (2008) has evolved from the frameworks used in the previous works under review. *Faces of Latin America* (1991) is divided into two sections: economics (mainly the evolution of the region's economic structure from commodity dependence to import substituting industrialisation) and politics (the role of different actors such as political parties, the military, the churches, the armed Left and new social movements (including women's and indigenous movements)).

Both *Faces of Latin America* and *Silent Revolution* (1995) present contemporary Latin America as forged by the clashes between different groups, based on their different interests with respect to identity and the productive economy. *Hidden Lives* (1998) departs from the emphasis on economic structure of the previous two books, and adopts a rights-based approach, founded on the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989). The focus shifts from structure to agency, in particular that of children, reflecting the preferred framework of Save the Children, which commissioned the book.

Similarly *Globalisation and its Discontents* (2002) emphasizes agency, in particular that of global civil society, exploring its rise and interaction with different economic discourses.

The reason for adopting ACES in the final work under review was in part an effort to correct the perceived weaknesses of the previous frameworks. It emerged organically from the research and discussions on the book, which changed over the course of writing from something of a developmental *tour d'horizon* to the more normative framework adopted in the final text. I had been influenced by DFID's work on 'drivers of change'¹ and was trying to set out a framework that would allow both NGO activists in Oxfam and elsewhere and the broader development community to

¹ Accessed at <http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/drivers-of-change> on 19 August 2010

sharpen their ability both to analyse and influence change. This section starts by reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the ACES framework itself.

Are citizens and states separate entities?

Describing ‘citizens’ and ‘states’ as separate entities whose interaction is a major determinant of development is an approach that has been challenged both at a theoretical and empirical level. Cohen and Arato (1992) argue that early thinking on civil society saw it as synonymous with the state. Hobbes (1651) believed sovereign power was the only ‘social bond’ of naturally unsocial yet rational individuals: the fusion of society springs from the power of the state. Locke (1690) differentiated between the two, and over the course of the Enlightenment, that distinction evolved in the work of Thomas Paine (1776), the US Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), which juxtapose an individualist, egalitarian society with government, and portrays society as the source of legitimate authority. (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 87)

But Mann (1993) believes such a division now ‘carries dangers’ (Mann, 1993, p. 23). Cox (1981) agrees, arguing that this juxtaposition is no longer valid:

‘This distinction [between state and civil society] made practical sense in the 18th and early 19th centuries, when it corresponded to two more or less distinct spheres of human activity or practice: to an emergent society of individuals based on contract and market relations which replaced a status-based society, on the one hand, and a state with functions limited to maintaining internal peace, external defence and the requisite conditions for markets on the other.... Today, however, state and civil society are so interpenetrated that the concepts ... are only vaguely and imprecisely indicative of distinct spheres of activity.’ (Cox, 1981, p. 126)

Cox proposes ‘state/society complexes’ as the basic entity of international relations, yielding a ‘plurality of forms of state, expressing different configurations of state/society complexes.’ (Cox, 1981, p. 127) Empirical study of citizen-state relations supports this view, finding for example, that many of the most active civil society

participants in participatory processes in Brazil are themselves state employees (Lavallo, Acharya and Houtzager, 2005). In his study of what he terms 'accountability politics' in Mexico, Fox (2007) identifies four main drivers of pro-accountability reform: governments (from above); civil society (from below); state employees (from within) and international actors (from outside), underlining the dangers of a simple analytical reduction to 'citizens' and 'states' (Fox, 2007, p. 340).

The flimsiness of the citizen/state divide has important consequences on the ground. Howell and Pearce (2001) argue that while aid donors in sub-Saharan Africa see a sharp division between civil society and the state, in fact, the same ethnic and kinship ties that underpin the neopatrimonial state are prevalent in civil society. They give the example of Church-based opposition to and support for the Moi regime in Kenya, which they see as organized along ethnic lines. (Howell and Pearce, 2001, p. 187)

Treating 'states' and 'citizens' as basic building blocks also ignores the importance of their internal structures. Mann (1993, p. 54) points out that 'under the microscope, states Balkanize, dissolving into competing departments and factions.' (Mann, 1993, p. 54) Similarly, Tarrow (1998) adds valuable insights into the internal structures of citizens' movements. Institutions such as churches are particularly economical 'host' settings in which movements can germinate. He sees large movements not homogenous but granular, made up of interlocking networks of small groups, social networks and the connections between them (Tarrow 1998, p.22).

While I think there are grounds for concern over too simplistic a distinction between state and citizen, section 5 of this review seeks to demonstrate that, provided their interaction is properly explored, the citizen-state dichotomy is sufficiently accurate to be meaningful, and can be retained without losing the importance or subtlety of their interaction. Abandoning it in favour of 'state/society complexes' or some other more accurate, but more inaccessible framework would damage the effort to build an accessible narrative of the kind my work is intended to achieve.

Are national boundaries a valid unit of analysis?

A second area of criticism is over what significant forces are left out by a national-level focus on states and citizens (or indeed, on state/society complexes). The state-

citizen framework highlights endogeneity, whereas a number of schools of thought (not all of them compatible) argue for a non-statist treatment of the world order and the place of domestic politics within it. Dependency theory and world systems approaches, for example, stress the erosion of the state by global forces under the control of outsiders.

Whether consciously or not, dependency theory and its simple divisions of North and South, or core and periphery, has influenced a good deal of NGO thinking and in part, my emphasis on the national was a conscious attempt to reorient a developmental debate in the UK that through campaigns on debt, trade and aid (reaching a peak with Make Poverty History in 2005), had hugely underestimated the importance of endogenous processes in development.

In a very different way, Held (in Nash, 2000) expounds a 'declinist' view of the state, arguing that 'The very process of governance seems to be escaping the categories of the nation-state' (Held, in Nash, 2000, p.327). Held identifies a number of drivers of the growing limits to state sovereignty and capacity: increasing economic and political connectedness removes a number of political instruments, such as border controls; the increased flow of ideas and cultural interchange undermines national exceptionalism; economic integration through trade and investment binds countries together and undermines the space for autonomous action. Many traditional state functions can no longer be carried out at national level (e.g. defence, economic management, communications, legal issues).

Held sees this as having led to an increasing need for pooled sovereignty and multilateral solutions, resulting in an overlapping and interlocking system of global governance that redefines the rights and obligations of states. (Nash, 2000, p. 327)

Watson (2005, chapter 8) sees a tension over the way international political economy scholars treat the state. "On the one hand, when IPE scholars are called upon to explain contemporary governance dilemmas associated with globalisation, the impression they give is typically one of a crisis of the modern state..... On the other hand, there remains an abiding attempt by many IPE scholars to locate all explanations of international economic developments at the level of 'the state'."

Watson believes this apparent contradiction arises from conflating the state with political authority in general. The state remains the main player, but its power is attenuated. The key distinction is between ‘the state’ as a policy-making body and a state project as the underlying orientation of policy.

From Poverty to Power struggled with this tension. Initially, I intended to write something of a polemic, arguing that the decline of the state had been massively overstated, resulting in an excessive emphasis by activists, decision makers and scholars on institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, to the neglect of the nation state, which still in large part runs the show. For instance, this is demonstrated by the failure of IMF/Bank conditionality (Easterly, 2005). However, after extensive discussion within Oxfam, I decided to make the book more comprehensive and less polemical, and the final text reflects a more balanced approach, recognizing the importance of exogenous forces, but arguing that their role is essentially of a second order, as an influence (benign or malign) on the effective operation of nation states. The section on the international system eventually became the largest in the book, but argued that in spite of the influence of global institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, the main actors in development remain endogenous - active citizens and national governments (Green, 2008, p. 292).

I remain of this view, since the evidence suggests that the ‘declinist’ school overstates both the novelty and the extent of erosion of state sovereignty. States have always been subject to exogenous forces; sovereignty has always been a compromise rather than an absolute. Understanding the role and effectiveness of the state remains the most powerful guide to the differential performance of different countries across a range of issues.

This shift in emphasis from exogeneity to endogeneity is reflected in the evolution of some, but not all, NGO advocacy positions, for example within campaigns on international trade, where a focus on northern agricultural dumping was gradually replaced by concerns on infringements of developing country ‘policy space’ through binding multilateral agreements on investment (Chang and Green, 2003).

The rise of global citizenship

Just as scholars have questioned the primacy of the nation state, and highlighted the rising importance of emerging global governance systems, so some have argued that citizenship too is increasingly escaping national boundaries.

Moreover, in this view globalisation has transformed the nature and exercise of citizenship at national levels, creating new political spaces for citizens' actions. The concept of 'global citizenship' challenges the conventional understanding of citizenship as exclusive membership and participation within a domestic political community.

This view was to some extent reflected in one of the works under review, *Globalisation and its Discontents* (2002). Prompted by my work as a policy analyst and lobbyist on the WTO and trade, and my participation at the Seattle WTO ministerial in 1999 as an NGO delegate, the paper discusses the 'movement of movements' around globalisation and trade. It argues that the movement was neither anti-globalisation, nor a single movement, but a mixture of 'statists' stressing national sovereignty, 'reformists' seeking to improve the rules governing globalisation and 'alternatives' rejecting globalisation and capitalism altogether. Over time it evolved from a mass peaceful movement at the Birmingham G8 in 1998, where it successfully pushed debt relief onto the G8 agenda, by way of the iconic Seattle meeting, to the violence and internal division that characterized the protests at the Genoa G8 in 2001. The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre severely weakened the protest movement, as political debate became polarized and the grounds for influencing shrank.

However, this focus on global citizenship was short-lived in my work, and by the time of *From Poverty to Power* it had been replaced by a more traditional focus on the promotion and exercise of citizenship within national boundaries. That shift of focus reflects an intention to redress the perceived hubris of the 'Make Poverty History' movement, with its implied message that northern activism holds the key to development. I work for an international NGO that has active global citizenship as an important part of its *raison d'être*, but I have become concerned that the noise of

global campaigning has come to drown out advocacy and activism at a national level. This is a live debate within the INGO movement, and I am firmly on the national end of the spectrum.

From Poverty to Power is perhaps too dismissive of the role of global citizenship. A literature survey by the Institute of Development Studies (2006) argues that it is possible to distinguish three overarching discourses on global citizenship: a civic republican discourse that emphasizes concepts such as awareness, responsibility, participation and cross-cultural empathy, a libertarian discourse that emphasizes international mobility and competitiveness and a legal discourse that emphasizes legal rights and responsibilities of transnational actors.

Those who subscribe to the civic republican view are essentially self-identifying global citizens who embrace political and social awareness, responsibility and participation - and the projection of these into the international arena. This often involves local citizens mobilizing locally who find that eventually to affect change they must mobilize in international spheres. Therefore to the extent that there is a local to global connection in the civic republican discourse it is frequently bottom-up and self-driven. This model fits with many of the more positive experiences of international citizen activism, for example around environmental issues, anti-corruption and indigenous rights.

The libertarian discourse, according to the IDS analysis, tends to highlight the desirability of unimpeded movement across the globe. The legal discourse focuses on international and transnational law and whether non-state actors such as transnational citizens, multinational corporations and collectives such as NGOs have rights and responsibilities in international law.

In a recent survey, however, Gaventa and McGee (2010), also of IDS, conclude that reports of the demise of national citizenship have been exaggerated:

‘International actors, whether the international NGOs or other international organisations, may support national change strategies, but rarely will create

sustainable policy reform if the movement for reform does not have deep national roots.’ (Gaventa and McGee, 2010, p. 36)

This fits with my own observation: the role of global citizenship is significant and is likely to grow, given trends such as improving technology, falling travel costs and the growing role of international institutions in the management of global public goods. In that sense it echoes the rise of global institutions and governance. But as with the impact of such institutions on nation states, national level citizenship is likely to retain the primary role, with its ‘policy space’ influenced, but not determined, by exogenous factors.

More recent work by Gaventa and Tandon (2010) explores an area neglected by the analysis in the works under review, namely the interaction between processes of global and national citizenship. On the basis of a number of case studies, the authors conclude that ‘Global citizenship is Janus-faced, simultaneously opening and constraining new meanings and practices of citizenship.’ (Gaventa and Tandon, 2010, p. 12). They identify three main factors that explain this apparent contradiction: whether the global processes are imposed from above (e.g. in return for funding) or are built from the bottom up and/or horizontal between countries; the role of ‘hybrid activists’ with the ability to maintain simultaneously a local identity and connection with global processes, and the existence (or absence) of a ‘global civic epistemology’, that establishes legitimacy in a world of soft power and knowledge networks. (Gaventa and Tandon, 2010, p.15).

Is the role of markets neglected in the ACES framework?

Another area apparently neglected by the focus on state and citizen is that of the private sector and the means of production. *From Poverty to Power* explains the decision to opt for a bi- rather than tri-polar framework by arguing that a flourishing private sector is itself the result of the interaction between effective states and active citizens. (Green, 2008, p. 14).

The reduction of the role of the private sector to merely responding to the enabling conditions created by the action of states and citizens may be excessive, given the

central role in development of growth, productivity improvements and innovation, which are all largely driven by the private sector. The assumption is that, with the right rules, any country can be China. That is not at all certain, and a deeper discussion of the role of markets in development, including why some countries seem better at producing entrepreneurs than others, is warranted.

The emphasis on how states and citizens shape the private sector also overlooks the influence flowing in the opposite direction. Economic power continues to shape politics and developmental outcomes. Cox (1981) sees production as the critical element in understanding the evolution of state/society complexes, arguing that historical structures evolve due to the interplay between three categories of forces: ideas, institutions and material capabilities. At certain times and places, these three forces produce a ‘fit’ – hegemony. In others, they come apart. Cox believes that the explanation for these divergent dynamics ‘may be sought in the realm of social forces shaped by production relations.’ (Cox, 1981, p. 141).

Despite considerable attention to the role of markets and the private sector, *From Poverty to Power*, in its efforts to invoke a sense of agency and possibility, may indeed have lost sight of the overall importance of different economic structures in determining political and social outcomes. This is perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the ACES framework and I return to this issue in the concluding section of the review.

Having discussed the choice of the ACES framework, I will now examine its separate components – active citizenship and effective states – in more depth.

3. Active Citizenship

Introduction

In *Faces of Latin America* (1991) and *Silent Revolution* (1995), the discussion of citizenship centres around issues of organized protest, reflecting the times in which they were written, including the role of new social movements in overthrowing

military dictatorships across the region in the 1980s, and the high level of popular organisation in the Central American civil wars of the period. This rather instrumentalist view of the role of social movements is clear in the structure of *Faces of Latin America*, where the subject is covered at the end of the chapter on 'the Left', which mainly focuses on guerrillas and revolution. Both books acknowledge the difficulties faced by the social movements as the region returned to electoral democracy and traditional political parties reappeared, in many cases leading to a decline in the vigour of popular organisation.

While the word 'citizenship' is barely used in the earlier books on Latin America, it is at the heart of the central thesis of *From Poverty to Power* (2008), which accepts that its definition extends well beyond political activism and blurred at the edges (Green, 2008, p. 20). This leaves some important questions unanswered: does being a good parent, a successful entrepreneur, or a devout churchgoer qualify? Are acts of citizenship necessarily collective? Although the book claims that the definition goes well beyond political activism, almost all the examples discussed are drawn from that much narrower field.

Hidden Lives (1998), with its discussion of child rights, and *From Poverty to Power* with its more nuanced treatment of power and rights (drawing on Lukes, 2005 and Uvin, 2004) recognise the intrinsic as well as instrumental benefits of citizenship. Whereas *Silent Revolution* bemoans the Latin American progressive movement's inability to move from protest (*protesta*) to proposal (*propuesta*), and goes on to discuss 'alternatives to neoliberalism', in the later books this recognition of the intrinsic importance of citizenship means that it constitutes to some extent an end in itself, rather than merely being a means of implementing the blueprint for some elusive 'alternative model'.

Despite this broader conception of the role of citizenship in the later works under review, a reading of the literature on citizenship reveals a number of lacunae in my thinking, which this section briefly explores.

Theories of Citizenship

The lack of distinction between the individual and collective aspects of citizenship echoes some of the divides in the literature. Lister and Pia (2008) suggest four interwoven themes in concepts of citizenship: rights, duties, participation and identity. They see three different theories of citizenship arising from the different priorities accorded to these themes:

- Liberal models that give priority to individual rights
- Communitarian models that place the emphasis on duties and identity
- Republican models that stress participation

For liberals, membership of the community is engendered through the equal granting of rights. For communitarians, membership is based around pre-existing cultural communities and citizenship rights are granted to members of that community who identify with their community and fulfil the resulting responsibilities and duties of citizenship. For republicans, participation is the cornerstone of membership (Lister and Pia 2008, p.8).

The origins of these conflicting models of citizenship lie largely in different readings of the history of Western Europe and North America, producing a Western bias in the analytical frameworks that is likely to hamper the discussion of citizenship in other contexts (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p.15).

Liberal theories of citizenship were born out of reaction to tyranny and the overweening state. John Locke, one of the founders of this school, argued that individuals should have the freedom to act, provided they respect others' ability to do the same. A similar argument is sustained in JS Mill (1869). Locke saw secure property rights as the most crucial aspect of these freedoms, arguing that 'the great end' of men entering society is 'the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety'. (Locke 1683, p.60)

TH Marshall (1963) added more collective considerations to the liberal interpretation, such as equality of outcome. Marshall distinguished between three kinds of

citizenship rights, drawing on British history. Civil rights were introduced in the 18th Century, in the form of personal liberties and the right to own property; political rights in the 19th Century brought the right to participate in the exercise of political power, and in the 20th Century, social rights were enshrined via the creation of the welfare state, and recognition of the right to share in economic wellbeing.

There are some major weaknesses in the liberal model of citizenship: it ignores non-class forms of exclusion; citizens are simply ‘granted rights’ rather than winning them through struggle or contestation. The focus, drawing on Rawls’ ‘unencumbered conception of the self’ ignores the communal nature of society and the construction of human identity. (Sandel, 1984, p. 83)

This last criticism is addressed by communitarian approaches to citizenship. Liberals and Communitarians differ in three main respects:

1. Rights and responsibilities: Since the community creates individuals, collective obligations take precedence over individual rights. Overemphasis on individuals’ pursuit of happiness undermines the common good. Amitai Etzioni (1993) highlighted this imbalance between rights and responsibilities. Crucially, Etzioni says, some responsibilities do *not* entail reciprocal rights, e.g. those owed to the physical environment but also to our ‘moral, social and political environment’. Etzioni (2004) has also argued that individual rights should be curtailed for public safety, after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center.

2. Membership and identity: For Liberals, the ‘unencumbered self’ means that rights are universal. Communitarians argue that the individual as moral subject only exists within pre-existing communities. Different communities have different notions of justice and conceptions of citizenship. Delanty (2000) argues that communitarians are concerned with defending the majority culture, and (contra multiculturalism), believe that incoming groups must adapt to the existing community.

3. The state and conceptions of the good: Liberal citizenship rests on the idea of the state as neutral actor, merely ensuring ‘procedural justice’ for individuals to enable them to exercise their rights and pursue whatever notion of ‘the good’ they choose.

Communitarians argue, in contrast, that the good is determined by the community (Kymlicka 2002).

But Communitarianism's extreme emphasis on collectivism risks condoning the oppression of the individual or minority groups. Moreover, in an increasingly atomised society, it has little to offer those not strongly identified with *any* community.

Republicanism, the third model of citizenship, shares Communitarianism's suspicion of liberal individualism (Dagger 2002). But instead of invoking the traditional bonds of pre-existing communities, republicans argue that citizenship is created through public participation. Building citizenship means creating conditions where individuals are self-governing, providing both freedom *and* membership. In many ways this is a revival of de Tocqueville and Rousseau. Recent proponents include Arendt (1958), Pocock (1975) and Barber (1984).

Republican Citizenship seems unclear over whether participation should be seen as an instrumental good (to defend individual rights) or an intrinsic good (as constitutive of identity and community).

One of the offshoots of Republican notions of citizenship is the concept of 'social capital'. By analogy with physical capital, 'social capital refers to the collective value of all 'social networks' and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other' (Putnam 1993²). Putnam's work has however, been criticised for conflating correlation and causality between indicators of civil society density and good governance, and skating over issues of politics and conflict (Fox 2007, p. 26; Harriss 2002). Moreover, advocates of the social capital approach see participation as important, but have few suggestions on how to promote it.

A major gap in the republican conception is that the exercise of citizenship is portrayed as largely pleasant and peaceful, if occasionally dull. Yet historically, active

² 'What does Social Capital mean?' Accessed at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/faqs.htm>, on 20 August 2010

citizenship includes occasional violent protest. Indeed Tarrow (1999) sees conflict as a defining characteristic of social movements. I return to this issue below.

This typology of models of citizenship helps clarify some of the dilemmas in my own thinking, but falls short in providing answers. My early books on Latin America reflected a more communitarian approach, stressing the collective while downplaying the importance of individual rights and participation in formal political processes. That evolved into a greater appreciation of the merits of participation in politics, albeit with significant reservations over the nature of electoral democracies. Liberal notions of individual rights are selectively addressed, with political and civil rights favoured, but the importance of individual property rights downplayed.

In practice, when discussing citizenship in developing country contexts, a combination of the three schools of thoughts is necessary. Citizenship should be conceptualized as both a status, which accords a range of rights and obligations, *and* an active practice. That combines the civic republican approach with the liberal and communitarian schools and puts the 'active' in 'active citizenship'. But combining these separate models also involves analysing the trade-offs and tensions that arise between them.

Citizenship and Representative Democracy

Over the period covered by the works being reviewed, a constant thread has been a complex and unresolved discussion of the merits and relative importance to development of electoral democracy, and its link to citizenship and social transformation. Both *Faces of Latin America* (1991) and *From Poverty to Power* (2008) start from the etymological root of the word democracy as 'people power', assessing the potential for empowerment of various expressions of democracy at national and local level.

The first edition of *Faces of Latin America* explores the interplay between citizens' organisations and the institutions of representative democracy, and paints the latter in an unflattering light. It wrestles with the apparent paradox that a return to democracy in the 1980s coincided with a move to the right in economic policy, as elected

governments introduced structural adjustment measures previously seen as the preserve of dictators such as Chile's Augusto Pinochet.

This is explained by focussing on the exclusionary nature of democracy in the region. Evidence comes from the long traditions of corporatism and vote-buying, the weak and fragmented nature of political parties, the overthrow of a radical elected government in Chile (1973) and the slow destruction by war and sanctions of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua (1979-1990), as well as the use of 'demonstration elections' as part of counter-insurgency strategy in El Salvador in the 1980s. *Faces of Latin America* argues that 'unelected forces such as foreign investors, the international financial institutions like the IMF, the military or powerful interest groups such as large landowners all exert huge political influence' (Green 1991, p.103). All this combines to create a deep sense of social exclusion and political alienation among citizens, who see the law as an instrument of oppression and turn to social movements as an alternative expression of protest (Green 1991, p.135). The book concludes that 'no Latin American government to date has managed to achieve both empowering democracy and stability.' (Green 1991, p. 103) Subsequent developments have invalidated that claim.

While citizenship (other than IMF riots) is largely ignored in *Silent Revolution, From Poverty to Power* highlights the intrinsic benefits of democracy and the link to respect for rights, but also acknowledges the prevalence of exclusionary forms of democracy. It also argues that democracy tends to avoid the extremes, for good or ill, demonstrated by unelected regimes, and so produces a smoother growth path compared to the boom-bust pattern characteristic of authoritarian regimes.

Sen (1999) portrays democracy as 'government by discussion' (Sen, 1999, p. 274) and argues that this political participation has intrinsic value for human well-being, making it a fundamental human right in itself. However, much of the literature echoes my ambivalence and disillusion with formal democracy. Mahbubani describes how, in many countries, democracy exists as a 'thin veneer of Western concepts', a set of formal institutions that do not translate into real democratic practice and culture on the ground (Mahbubani, 2005, p. 52). Greig (2007) captures the disillusion that set in once the post-colonial euphoria wore off, 'The new democratic institutions were often

found to be shallow-rooted.’ (Greig, 2007, p. 221) Myrdal (1977) wrote of ‘soft states in which governments require extraordinarily little of their citizens.’ (Myrdal, 1977, p. 150)

Leftwich (2002) concludes ‘It is the structural contradiction between the conservative requirements of stable democratic survival and the urgent transformative imperatives of late development which makes the combination of democracy and development so difficult.’ (Leftwich, 2002, p. 270)

Cohen and Arato (1992, p.77) make a helpful distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘political society’, arguing that in some circumstances political society mediates between civil society and the state, but in others, it replaces it. Cornwall (2004) distinguishes between ‘invited spaces’ for democratic participation created by the government; ‘popular spaces’ where people organise independently, for example to protest against government policies or to provide mutual aid; and ‘conquered spaces’ that are provided or taken over by the public as a result of successful political action. People wishing to follow the lead of countries such as Brazil in experimenting with the expansion of democratic spaces through bottom-up participatory mechanisms should recognise that conquered and popular spaces are more likely to be successful than invited spaces, which are prone to being co-opted by dominant groups resulting in the reproduction of social hierarchies and relationships of domination and exclusion (Cornwall, 2004, pp 1-10).

Despite the obvious limitations of parliamentary democracy, my reading of the literature combined with my experience of living under military governments in Argentina, leaves me convinced that, in the words of Winston Churchill, ‘democracy is the worst form of Government... except all those others that have been tried’ (Churchill, 1947). The challenge is to extract the most in terms of social and political transformation from within a democratic system, through the development of progressive institutions and social forces along the lines that Cornwall describes.

The Dynamics of citizenship: cycles of contention

An exploration of the literature on citizenship highlights the weaknesses of the works under review in understanding the dynamics of citizen activism. *Faces of Latin America* and *Silent Revolution* portray a world of ‘permanent revolution’ at the grassroots, celebrating social movement participation as valuable in itself, irrespective of its outcomes and with little acknowledgement of its potential costs to those involved, or that it typically evolves through what Tarrow (1998, p.19) calls ‘cycles of contention’. The return to elected government in Latin America and the consequent decline of many of the more dynamic protest-oriented social movements is a typical example of such a cycle.

From Poverty to Power is more aware of such dynamics, arguing that ‘civil society activity waxes and wanes, coming into its own in moments of protest and crisis, and often falling away after a victory.’ (Green 2008, p. 61). It also acknowledges that some civil society movements (e.g. those based on religious institutions) are often more stable than others, such as single-issue groups.

The literature adds considerable depth to this understanding of the dynamics of protest. Tarrow (1998) tries to answer the Marxist/structuralist dilemma of why some people ‘ought’ to revolt (given their objective conditions), but do not, finding that the protest requires what he terms ‘patterns of political opportunities and constraints’, ‘inherited cultural symbols’, and dense social networks and connective structures (Tarrow, 1998, p. 19)

Once those conditions are given, citizen-state interaction triggers cycles of contention (Tarrow, 1998, p. 24). Tarrow sees a dynamic of repression, partial victories leading to reform, and demobilisation, repeating itself in Europe over the last two centuries. The response to cycles of contention is often repressive, but even repression is often mixed with reform. As conflict collapses and militants retire to lick their wounds, many of their gains are reversed, but they often leave behind incremental expansions in participation, changes in popular culture, and residual movement networks. Cycles of conflict are a season for sowing, but the reaping is often done in the periods of demobilisation that follow, by latecomers to the cause, elites and authorities. Quite

how social movements can best negotiate and survive the bouts of conflict, the intervening lulls and steady state democratic activity is not clear from Tarrow, and would be an important area for research in the context of developing countries today.

Tarrow's work sheds some light on the apparent weakness of global citizenship, discussed above. If active citizenship is defined by cycles of contention, those cycles require an institutional target. The weakness of global institutions means that the situation resembles that at national level, when the nation state was only beginning to penetrate society and become the main target for citizen action. At a global level, there is literally nothing to burn down, leaving global movements to find symbolic proxies such as the World Bank or WTO that are often far less powerful at a global scale than governments or other state institutions at a national level.

'Bad' Citizenship

In the earlier works on Latin America, citizenship is portrayed as inherently progressive, and examples of the opposite (e.g. episodes of popular support for dictators and military governments) are ignored. The 'people' are invariably progressive; the 'elites' their reactionary enemy. *From Poverty to Power* acknowledges occasions of reactionary acts of citizenship, such as the genocide in Rwanda (Green 2008, p. 433) but does not attempt to explain what might distinguish such cases from positive acts of citizenship.

Criticisms of this rather romantic view of citizenship come from several directions. Marx (1844) stressed the negative aspects of civil society as an expression of purely political (rather than economic) rights, seeing it as inherently atomistic and dehumanising. While time and Gramsci moderated that rather crude form of class reductionism, recent decades have seen further critiques, for example Althusser (1970) painted a grim picture of civil society as a cog in the machine of the state's 'ideological apparatus', comprising religious, educational, family, legal, trade union, communications and cultural components.

The most telling recent critiques of citizenship concentrate on the power imbalances *within* civil society. Fox (2007) studied accountability in six processes in rural

Mexico and concluded that civil society organisations with good links to the state actively conspired to exclude organisations of the marginalized: ‘in all of the projects that actually underwent implementation, the key institutional obstacles were grounded in state-society coalitions that opposed power-sharing with poor people’s organisations, particularly indigenous people’s groups. These coalitions were well entrenched both in state governments and within national agencies.’ (Fox, 2007, p.170) This finding echoes the widespread tensions in many developing countries between middle class, professional NGOs, and mass membership social movements.

However, none of these criticisms provide a useful framework for understanding the origins and nature of citizenship on display in the Rwandan genocide, or communal rioting in India or Indonesia, or in Nazi German’s persecution of the Jews. This seems like a significant gap in the literature on citizenship.

Having reviewed some relevant literature on citizenship, I now turn to the other half of the ACES framework, ‘effective states’.

4. Effective States

Introduction

The treatment of the state has grown in depth and sophistication during the course of the works under review, but it started from close to zero. The first edition of *Faces of Latin America* discusses political parties in some depth, but portrays politics as ‘a game for the rich’ (Green, 1991, p. 108) that then evolved into a form of exclusionary corporatism in the 20th Century. There is no discussion on the origins and role of the state, which is either absent, or seen as a tool of the economic and political elite.

For the second edition, the main change in structure, following a consultation with staff at the Institute for Latin American Studies in London, was to turn the chapter on ‘Democracy and Politics’ into one on ‘the State and Politics’. This concluded that ‘the twin threads of democracy and authoritarianism run through Latin America’s history since independence, sometimes alternating between periods of democratic or

dictatorial rule, at other times combining to produce hybrid forms of authoritarian democracy.’ (Green 1997, p. 109)

The first half of *Silent Revolution* is similarly crude, stressing the role of elite ideas and interests, but barely referring to the institutions of the state or whether they maintain any distance from economic elites. There is no discussion of the level of autonomy of central banks, finance ministries, the judiciary or other components of the states, just ‘elites, governments and foreigners.’ However, chapter 8 on alternative development models, with an extended study of the Asian NICs, and an appendix comparing neostructuralism with neoliberalism and import substitution, introduces a more detailed discussion of the role of the state, which is subsequently developed in *From Poverty to Power*. *Silent Revolution* contrasted the strength of the national bourgeoisie and technocratic civil service in East Asia with its weakness in Latin America (Green 1995, p. 183)

However, the book then fails to pursue this line of thought, by, for example, analysing the different levels of state autonomy and capability in different Latin America republics, where the considerable state capacity in countries such as Chile and Brazil contrasts with much weaker states in the Andes or Central America.

The interest in the Asian NICs that began with *Silent Revolution* subsequently blossomed through my work on industrial policy and the WTO and a close working relationship with heterodox and institutional economist Ha-Joon Chang (Chang and Green, 2003). Chang’s book *Kicking Away the Ladder*, 2001 was a particular influence. This evolved in *From Poverty to Power* into a complete embrace of the state as the core institution in development: ‘Of all the institutions that exercise power over people’s lives, it is the state that is capable of channelling the power of individual initiative and the market toward long-term development goals.’ (Green, 2008, p. 21) However beneath this enthusiasm lie a series of conflicts and contradictions that a reading of the literature can help clarify, if not resolve.

In contrast to the literature on citizenship, that on the role of the state, at least in the post-colonial period, draws heavily on the experience outside the West. There are rich, but largely separate, literatures on state emergence in Africa and Latin America,

but it is the study of the Asian state, in particular the ‘developmental states’ of East Asia, that has had most influence. However, there are two weaknesses in the literature. Firstly, attempts at cross-regional comparisons, in particular the question of the conditions under which developmental states could arise outside Asia, are patchy and inconclusive. Secondly, the longer-term historical sociology on state emergence remains dominated by the European and North American experiences (Mann, 1993, p. 479), whether because of their more recent history (though that hardly applies in the case of Asian states such as Korea that have endured for millennia), or a bias in the literature.

Definitions of States and Effectiveness

Khan (2004) sees the analysis of state failure and the accompanying policy debate as driven by two very different underlying views of what the state does. The first, the “service delivery” view, says the role of the state is to provide law and order, stable property rights, key public goods and welfarist redistribution (see for example the list of state functions in Maxwell, 2006). The second locates the developing country state in the context of “social transformation”: the dramatic transition these countries are going through as traditional production systems collapse and a capitalist economy begins to emerge.

From Poverty to Power uses both of these views interchangeably, arguing that ‘States ensure health, education, water, and sanitation for all; they guarantee security, the rule of law, and social and economic stability; and they regulate, develop, and upgrade the economy.’ (Green, 2008, p. 21) But, as the subtitle to the book shows, states are also presented as transformatory.

The meaning of the word ‘effective’ is both even less clear and largely circular. Effective states are essential to development, runs the argument. And how do we know what is an effective state? Because it achieves development! This confusion essentially arises through my decision to rename ‘developmental states’ as ‘effective states’. *From Poverty to Power* admits at the outset that the two are synonymous (Green 2008, p. 12). After that, however the term is barely used, in an attempt to universalize the discussion on the role of the developmental state beyond its identification with East Asia, and to distance the proposition from the authoritarian

associations evoked by the Asian NICs. It thus opens the possibility of a more positive discussion of the way states and citizens interact in the development path, giving more weight to soft indicators such as legitimacy and accountability, rather than merely hard indicators such as growth or rule of law.

Which Development Model?

The treatment of the state necessarily follows from the underlying development model adopted in the works under review, but this is not made explicit. The works on Latin America were written, whether implicitly or in the case of *Silent Revolution*, explicitly, as a rebuttal of the neoliberal or Washington Consensus development model (Williamson 1989). These books' emphasis on issues of power and conflict also imply a rejection of the more linear and technocratic approaches of modernisation theory (Rostow, 1960).

The relationship with dependency (Frank 1966) and world systems (Wallerstein 1974) theories is more complex. *Faces of Latin America* flirts with dependency theory in its focus on the commodity trade and neo-colonialism as the underlying forces shaping the region's social and economic structures (Green, 1991, chapter 1), while *Silent Revolution*, with a whole chapter on the 'poverty brokers' at the IMF and World Bank, stresses the importance of exogenous forces. But it also acknowledges both the role of elites and the crisis of the preceding economic model in promoting neoliberal transformation (Green, 1995, p. 23)

The analysis in the later works under review coincides with that of the neo-Gramscian left, which criticised the World Systems approach for 'its tendency to undervalue the state by considering it as merely derivative from its position in the world system (strong states in the core, weak states in the periphery)' and 'its alleged system-maintenance bias... better at accounting for forces that maintain or restore a system's equilibrium than identifying contradictions which can lead to a system's transformation.' (Cox, 1981, p. 127)

Neoliberalism and the Post Washington Consensus

In its chapter on ‘alternatives to neoliberalism’ (Green 1995, pp 176-199), *Silent Revolution* identifies three sources of ideas: the Asian Newly Industrialisation Countries (NICs), the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL)’s thinking on ‘neoliberalism’ and the loose cluster of ideas emerging from the Latin American Left, including scattered grassroots experiments, the World Social Forum and the ‘Alternatives for the Americas’ movement. The Left alternative has so far failed to gel into a coherent or convincing overall economic or development strategy.

The three alternative development models discussed in *Silent Revolution* reappear in different guise in *From Poverty to Power* 13 years later as the post-Washington Consensus, effective states and the economic aspects of active citizenship, and many of the analytical gaps and tensions between them are unresolved.

Silent Revolution portrays neoliberalism as giving more importance than its more statist structuralist forebears to the role of the private sector, macroeconomic stability, equity and poverty reduction (Green 1995, p. 188). In this, it resembles a more radical variant of the post-Washington Consensus, as set out by Rodrik in what he preferred to call the ‘augmented Washington Consensus (Rodrik, 2001, p. 15). Both are broad currents of thinking across a wide political spectrum, rather than tightly specified policy prescriptions, and both converge and overlap in the middle of the state-market spectrum, having begun their political journey from opposite extremes.

While I agree with many of its policy prescriptions, I share Anthony Payne’s view that the post-Washington Consensus is ‘a technocratic fix to political problems’ (Payne, 2005, p. 89). Onis and Senses (2005) criticise its denial of issues of international power and the erosion of state sovereignty. It fails to address underlying issues of power, politics or redistribution, although adding an institutional focus and enhanced (and improved) policy prescriptions such as capital account regulation, social protection and anti-corruption measures are undoubtedly steps forward on the original Washington Consensus. In that sense, the post-Washington Consensus leaves

little role for citizens beyond electing governments and curbing criminal activity through enhanced scrutiny.

Neoliberalism, as analysed in appendix B of *Silent Revolution* (Green, 1995, pp. 244-249) adds a greater emphasis on equity, redistribution and democratic accountability, but suffers from the same tendency to technocratic solutions as the post-Washington Consensus. *Silent Revolution* sees the barriers to adoption primarily in the international political economy (Green, 1995, p. 191), but equally, endogenous sources of opposition are likely to be significant. This blind spot on political economy is a major weakness in both schools of thought.

With hindsight, *From Poverty to Power*'s inclusion of active citizenship in its 'magic formula' for development can be seen as an attempt to fill this analytical gap, albeit only partially successful.

Both neoliberalism and the post-Washington Consensus make 'growth with equity' the overriding goal of policy and government action. This model has come under increasing criticism due to the apparent incompatibility of long-term growth rates with the need to curb climate change and stay within other planetary boundaries. However, as yet, the discussion on limits to growth has been confined to the grand plans of environmentalists, with little thought given to the political or economic feasibility or consequences of shifts to a lower or zero growth path (Jackson, 2009; Green, 2010).

The Developmental State

Chalmers Johnson, the scholar who coined the term 'developmental state' in relation to Japan, (Johnson 1998), argued that its essential features were a small, inexpensive but elite state bureaucracy; a political system in which the bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take initiative and operate effectively; the perfection of a range of market-conforming methods of state intervention in the economy and a pilot organisation (such as Japan's MITI) that needs to combine planning, energy, domestic production, international trade and a share of finance.

Subsequent authors sought to broaden out beyond Japan's experience. Rapley (2007) sees the requirements for a developmental state to emerge as state capacity (often heavily influenced by colonial legacy); a technocratic elite; the concentration of power (often after a Bonapartist moment, when a shock leads to centralisation of power, enabling the government to vanquish opponents and introduce structural change) and a strong national bourgeoisie. (Rapley, 2007, p. 142)

Onis (1991) sees the developmental state theories as adding an 'institutionalist perspective' that 'attempts to transcend the structuralist development economics which downplayed the key role of markets in the industrialisation process.' (Onis 1991, p. 110). An important feature of developmental state theories is the central role of a strong core of state institutions with the capacity to promote economic growth without being 'captured' by particularist interests. This is what Peter Evans (1995) has called 'embedded autonomy'.

The concept of embedded autonomy has provoked considerable reflection in particular in discussions about whether the developmental state is unique to East Asia, or potentially replicable elsewhere. Onis (1991) portrays his 'central insight' as 'that the degree of government-business cooperation and consensus on national goals, unique to the developmental state, is not purely the product of a given cultural environment, but has been largely engineered by the state elites themselves through the creation of a special set of institutions relying on a significant element of compulsion.' (Onis, 1991, p. 110) He argues that both an external threat (e.g. from Communist China) and an egalitarian starting point before rapid industrialisation were crucial in creating this environment.

The developmental state is the model that best describes my treatment of the state in *From Poverty to Power*, but the literature on developmental states raises a number of difficult challenges and tensions. The main tension - whether developmental states are incompatible with the exercise of active citizenship - is discussed at length in the next section, but there are several other problems with the model that need to be highlighted.

Developmental states and the ACES framework

The first is how developmental states emerge – is it through an act of political will, or historical accident (e.g. the presence of an external threat, or the providential destruction of existing elites, as in South Korea and Taiwan)? If the national bourgeoisie is at the outset more *rentier* than patriotic, are political conditions ever likely to arise for the transition to a developmental state?

Onis (1991) is doubtful, arguing that East Asia's single-minded pursuit of growth in response to external threats is probably unique, and that the model is incompatible with democratic pluralist traditions or with long term stability. Rapley (2007) is also sceptical on replicability, arguing that 'the economic and political weaknesses of indigenous capitalists in much of the Third World seem to preclude developmental states from emerging in many more countries at this time..... The absence of a productive bourgeoisie may not be an insurmountable obstacle to development, but it does make the emergence of a developmental state a good deal less likely.' (Rapley, 2007, p. 148)

Hagmann and Péclard (2010) question what they see as Western assumptions behind much of the literature on state formation, contrasting this with the findings of empirical research that state weakness in Africa is nothing new, and that informal institutions have always filled the gaps. African public authorities 'wax and wane' in a process of contestation and negotiation. The authors describe this as 'negotiating statehood' (p. 541). They see such negotiations as taking place over three recurrent issues, security provision, the balance of power between capitals and regions, and processes of exclusion/inclusion on the basis of, for example, ethnicity or religion. (p. 552)

In an influential book that challenged the focus on exogenous forces espoused by the Make Poverty History campaign and the Gleneagles G8 Summit of 2005, Lockwood (2005) examines the nature of the African state. He argues that the response of regimes to the instability of clientelism (itself an inevitable consequence of the dynamics of rapid decolonisation), including Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, was to centralize and bureaucratize power. Most of these changes

happened in the 1960s. A wide range of powers were taken into the office of an executive president. In other states, including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, Ghana and Somalia, the incipient crisis of clientelism was not resolved, leaders did not bureaucratize and centrally control clientelism, and the system as a result became more and more unstable. Political competition and the extent of looting were magnified where countries possessed significant mineral resources. (Lockwood 2005, p. 74)

Lockwood concludes that the prevalence of clientelism in the weakest states, and neopatrimonialism in stronger ones, means that chances of fully-fledged developmental states emerging in Africa are 'not particularly optimistic' (Lockwood, 2005, p.113). The 2005 Africa Commission agrees, concluding 'One thing underlies all the difficulties caused by the interactions of Africa's history over the past 40 years. It is the weakness of governance and the absence of effective states.' (Africa Commission, 2005, p.24)

Mkandawire (2001) vehemently rejects this analysis:

'In the African case "neopatrimonialism" has been used to explain import substitution, export orientation, parastatals, privatisation, the informal sector development, etc. The result is that, in seeking to explain everything, it explains nothing.'

But Mkandawire fails to offer a plausible account of how developmental states *could* emerge in Africa, while taking refuge in blaming international financial institutions for stifling their creation. As a result, Lockwood's efforts to identify sparks of hope in the performance of countries like Botswana and Ghana actually contain more grounds for optimism than Mkandawire's broadside.

Lockwood points to the importance of political leadership in the case of arguably Africa's most successful state, Botswana, and a combination of a particularly strong history of civil-society groups and the scrutiny of an increasingly active media in the case of Ghana, another potential candidate for the status of 'an African developmental state'.

The contemporary version of this discussion surrounds the conditions under which 'fragile states' can transform into effective states. In a summary of its recent research on fragile states, DFID (2010) highlights the importance of 'political settlements', which it defines as 'the types of informal as well as formal political bargains that can end conflict and bring sustainable peace, promote reform, development and poverty reduction – or fail to achieve any such progress. Political settlements represent: "the forging of a common understanding, usually between elites, that their best interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organising political power."(Whaites, 2008, p.4)

A political settlement therefore forms the relationship between formal and informal institutions and the distribution of power in society. The two must be compatible because "if powerful groups are not getting an acceptable distribution of benefits from an institutional structure, they will strive to change it' and the combination must also have a minimal level of economic and political performance to be sustainable." (Khan, 2010, p. 4) The underlying politics can allow some 'pockets' of effective governance to exist even in contexts of general failure. (Leonard, 2008)

One key message that emerges from the literature is that the transition to a new political settlement is often linked to shocks such as conflict or economic crisis. Charles Tilly (1990) pithily argues 'war made the state and the state made war' (Tilly, 1990, p. 54) while Mulgan (2006) points out that four of the five permanent member states of the UN Security Council were born out of violent revolution (Mulgan, 2006, p. 149). Rosser (2006) in a survey of turnaround states, finds that shocks that led to change included the fall of Sukarno in Indonesia; the end of the Cold War in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and civil war in Mozambique.(Rosser, 2006, p.5)

Other authors point to early action on redistribution of property rights (Khan, 2004) and the importance of direct taxation as a means of building accountability and the social contract between state and citizen (Moore 2004).

Pointing to the example of Taiwan, Chang (2007) argues that turnarounds can, however, be gradual. Even when government finances are poor, it is possible to create

pockets of clean bureaucracy with meritocratic principles and relatively attractive salaries, and later use them as templates to clean up the rest. More subtly, Chang (2007b) argues that even if it is difficult ‘to change deep-rooted institutions through political means, it may be possible to change them by introducing new economic activities that create demand for different kinds of institutions.’ (Chang, 2007b, p.13)

Overall, what the literature shows is the importance of understanding the complexities of the drivers of political and social change in any given context. These will go far beyond ‘active citizenship’ (a term that itself conceals a rich internal structure), to include the different institutions that make up the state, the private sector and other potential influencers. These will determine if and when fragile states can become turnaround states, whether policies are implemented, whether economies flourish, and whether the proceeds are shared evenly. *From Poverty to Power* started developing some thinking in this area through the annex and case studies on ‘how change happens’ (Green 2008, pp. 432-444). It would be extremely worthwhile to pursue that work further, exploring both the distinct drivers of different change episodes, and the nature of their interaction.

Having separately reviewed the literature on citizenship and the role of the state, the next section explores the central issue in *From Poverty to Power*, their interaction.

5: Citizen-State Interactions

Introduction

The evolution of the thinking in the works under review has led towards the identification of active citizens and effective states as the two great drivers of development. But the nature of the interaction between these two forces is complex, and varies enormously across space and time. While offering some initial thoughts on this interplay, the works do not reach any great depth of understanding or conclusion. This section summarizes that discussion, explores what the literature has to offer in terms of additional insights, and identifies some key gaps both in the works, and in the literature, that merit further research.

In the first of the works under review, *Faces of Latin America* (1991) stresses the progressive role of social movements and the armed left, portraying them as confronting political and economic elites, both national and international. It fails to identify the state as a key actor in regional development, in anything but a negative role.

By the time *Silent Revolution* appeared in 1995, the ‘discovery’ (by me, at least) of the developmental state in East Asia leads to ‘uncomfortable questions for those seeking a more democratic alternative to neoliberalism in Latin America - how is it that the most economically egalitarian and successful third world economies are so authoritarian and undemocratic? Can long-term development along Asian lines be achieved only by shutting out the voices of the majority of the people? How can a more participatory model in Latin America avoid the pent-up demands of the poor from immediately forcing the government into over-spending’ (Green, 1995, p. 183).

Silent Revolution leaves these questions unanswered, and in its concluding pages portrays the interaction between state and citizen as a dialectic in which radical counter-movements force those in power to move towards a model closer to the neostructuralist balance of growth with equity. (Green, 1995, p. 208)

From Poverty to Power repeats the ‘uncomfortable questions’, asking ‘Effective states in East Asia and elsewhere have typically taken off with little initial recognition of human rights or democracy, although this has often improved later on; in Latin America, active social movements and political organisations have rarely been accompanied by effective states. Are the two mutually exclusive?’ (Green, 2008, p. 94)

It then offers some tentative reasons for optimism that the two can indeed coexist. There may be a selection bias, in that those countries with *both* active citizens and effective states (e.g. in Scandinavia) have prospered, and so disappeared from the development map. An attempt at a more data-based approach foundered on the lack of reliable data on levels of active citizenship, but ‘seems to suggest a positive correlation between active citizenship and effective states. Although this does not

prove which came first, it at least suggests that they are not mutually incompatible.’ (Green 2008, p. 94) Finally, it asserts that the authoritarian road to state-building is getting harder, because ‘The spread of democracy makes it much harder for today’s autocrats to achieve legitimacy, either at home or in the eyes of the international community. Widespread awareness of rights means that economic growth alone, while necessary, will not guarantee legitimacy, much less bring about the deep transformations that constitute real development.’ (Green, 2008, p. 95)

It has to be admitted that this final argument is not particularly convincing. Paul Kagame’s government in Rwanda suggests that while today’s autocrats may have to adopt the trappings of democracy, one party systems are still a viable route to state-building. China provides a rather more significant counter-example. A recent review by William Easterly (2010)³ concluded that autocracies have much higher variance of growth rates, so they have both the best and the worst growth rates. There are several problems in trying to settle this issue. Firstly, the number of cases is limited, especially when considering changes over time (for example the hypothesis that autocratic development is becoming less feasible). Secondly, the variables used to describe development vary from hard (GDP) to soft (respect for rights, capabilities, legitimacy).

In recent years, perhaps driven by normative rather than empirical concerns, a number of authors have discussed the feasibility and desirability of ‘democratic developmental states’. Such states require an extension of Evans’ idea of embedded autonomy beyond the formal private sector. For a state to overcome its lack of information *and* achieve legitimacy, it needs to be embedded in a wider group of social actors in order ‘to use its autonomy to consult, negotiate and elicit consensus and cooperation from its social partners in the task of national economic reforms and adjustment. Cooperation is therefore a central element of the developmental state.’ Edigheji (2005) calls this ‘inclusive embeddedness’ ((Edigheji, 2005, p.14).

Even if Mkandawire and Soludo are right that ‘the constitution of “democratic developmental states” may be the single most important task on the policy agenda in

³ ‘Solving the mystery of the benevolent autocrat’, <http://aidwatchers.com/2010/09/solving-the-mystery-of-the-benevolent-autocrat/>, accessed on 6th October 2010

Africa' (Mkandawire and Soludo, 2004), the literature is not helpful in explaining how they might come about, with plenty of signs of hope triumphing over analysis. White (1995) echoes the argument on increasing obstacles to authoritarianism, arguing that domestic and international pressures make the authoritarian path increasingly difficult, and that 'democracy comes to every country in fragments or parts; each fragment becomes an incentive for the addition of another'. Randall echoes this view. Arguing that 'we are moving towards a revised, more inclusionary understanding of the developmental state. Fritz and Menocal (2007) cite the recent history of Brazil, India, South Africa, Mauritius and Botswana as examples 'that democratisation and an increase in the developmental orientation of the state can occur simultaneously', but do not discuss the fact that these are among the most unequal and (at least in the case of India) exclusionary societies in the world, or whether this is either a precondition or a consequence of the combination of democracy and developmentalism.

This discussion harks back to CEPAL's efforts to propagate a form of neostructuralism that combines accountability and responsiveness with the developmental state (see section 4). However, while recognizing the forces tilting the balance towards inclusion and democracy, the literature does not discuss whether these come at a price, for example reducing the 'embedded autonomy' of technocratic elites in budding developmental states, leading to premature capture by particular groups, whether they be economic elites, or mass organisations such as trades unions, or in what circumstances this might be to the long term detriment of the country's developmental path. Nor do these works enter into any discussion on sequencing and pace – does democratisation now occur earlier in the trajectory of state building, and is that trend likely to continue?

I am thus left with an unpalatable conclusion, given that I work and write for an organisation that advocates a greater role for active citizenship at all times, in all places. While developmental (or effective) states are historically a *sine qua non* for economic development, measured in terms of income per capita, active citizenship is equally essential to achieve development in the wider sense – an accumulation of freedoms 'to do and to be' (Sen, 1999). But there are likely to be trade-offs between these two goals, even though the nature and extent of which is probably changing

over time, in response to cultural shifts on attitudes to human rights, technological changes in access to information, and the partial encroachment into national political spaces of international governance regimes on issues such as human rights. High levels of growth are more likely to be achieved with the sacrifice of some freedoms, and vice versa.

Active Citizenship in Non-Democratic States

The works under review, along with much of the literature on citizenship, fail to analyse in any depth the nature of active citizenship in non-democratic states. The major exception is protest movements that oppose and occasionally help overthrow authoritarian regimes. Yet 'peacetime' active citizenship is clearly a significant political factor in contemporary China and Vietnam. Further research could illuminate how citizenship in such contexts differs from that in more democratic regimes, and the different ways that non-democratic states seek to crush, contain or respond to such pressures.

When this subject is discussed, it is most commonly framed in terms of 'legitimacy'. A state enjoys political legitimacy when the people over whom the state exercises its authority accept 'its right to rule'. Chalmers Johnson, in his influential analysis of developmental states, argues that:

'In the true developmental state, the bureaucratic rulers possess a particular kind of legitimacy that allows them to be much more experimental and undoctinaire than in the typical authoritarian regime. This is the legitimacy that comes from devotion to a widely believed-in revolutionary project.'
(Chalmers Johnson, quoted in Woo-Cumings 1998, p.20).

Woo-Cumings (1998) cites this passage, arguing that 'Western observers have a hard time understanding the legitimacy of the developmental regime in East Asia.... Frank authoritarianism in interwar Japan, post-war Korea and post-war Taiwan combined with Western humiliation and strong nationalism, proved a powerful forge on which legitimate political power could finally rise.' (Woo-Cumings, 1998, p.20)

State-Citizen Conflict

Although *From Poverty to Power* acknowledges that conflict is often a feature of state-citizen relations, it largely puts forward a vision of peaceful interaction and negotiation. Much of the literature is less sanguine. Are citizen-state interactions primarily constructive or conflictive? Greig (2007) ties this debate into the wider division between liberals and structuralists:

‘From a liberal democratic perspective, civil society puts limits on state power, provides an arena for citizen participation, promotes the development of democratic values, provides the means to aggregate and articulate interests and lowers the burden and demands placed on the state. But from a Structuralist perspective, civil society is primarily about struggles with the state to overcome unequal power relations.’ (Greig, 2007, p. 226)

Empirical work by Gaventa and McGee (2010) suggests that conflict is central to episodes of successful citizen-driven policy change, but has often been overlooked. (Gaventa and McGee, 2010, p. 29). Tarrow (1998) goes further in emphasising the role of ‘contentious politics’ in citizen-state interaction, making conflict part of his definition of a social movement. (Tarrow, 1998, p. 10)

Again, the literature poses some difficult personal challenges for me. While an unashamed supporter of revolutionary violence in Central America in the 1980s, a view reflected in *Faces of Latin America*, I subsequently came to see insurrectionary violence as very much a last resort, both due to its record of transmuting into dispersed social violence in the aftermath of conflicts, and its poor record in producing transformatory states (Green 1995, p. 208).

What needs further research (and appears to be a gap in the literature) is a clearer understanding of the moments and contexts in which violent conflict produces lasting change, and the nature of conflict and other preconditions that is most likely to achieve it.

Building on empirical work in Mexico, Fox (2007) provides useful insights into the links between citizenship, conflict and state building through his discussion of the evolution of ‘accountability politics’, arguing that ‘the construction of public accountability is driven by cycles of mutually reinforcing interaction between the thickening of civil society and state reformist initiatives.... Accountability politics is driven largely by voice and power, mediated rather than determined by formal institutions. Accountability politics unfolds in arenas of conflict that are broader than formal authority structures, including political parties, social movements, the private sector, the mass media and others.’ (Fox, 2007, p. 1)

Reinforcing dynamics between state and society can lead to low or high accountability equilibria. Fox argues that, by analogy with much better understood transitions to democracy, we need to study and understand ‘transitions to [high] accountability’. We know more about what is *not* true (“elections lead to accountability”) than what is true about ‘how accountability governance becomes stronger, or how it spreads from enclaves across entire state apparatuses, or how accountability expands vertically, from the local to the national or vice versa....How public institutions transition from complete authoritarian impunity to uneven combinations of responsiveness and accountability.’ (Fox, 2007, p. 10)

Fox shows the need to focus on substance, rather than procedures, and thus helps clarify the differences in the treatment of electoral democracy by Sen and others discussed on page 16.

When does Active Citizenship lead to State-Building?

The specific dynamics of how active citizenship influences the state are only occasionally touched on in *From Poverty to Power*, in particular through a series of eight case studies on ‘How Change Happens’ scattered throughout the book and discussed in an annex of that name. The literature offers some useful additional insights into this process.

Drawing on his time at the heart of the British Government, Geoff Mulgan (2006) sees one of the main influences of active citizenship as developing new institutions and solutions, in a tradition of creating communities designed on different lines

stretching back centuries. 'A myriad of pragmatic idealists created new forms of social organisation and new ways of living that spread and even became mainstream. An alternative history of social change would show how these were designed, adapted and diffused, often in the face of resistance from existing interests, and how much of what we think of now as the service state was first incubated away from bureaucracies and politicians.' (Mulgan, 2006, p. 237) Mulgan concludes that 'the great merit of activism is that it shows us what is hard and what is soft, the plasticity of power as well as its resilience.' (Mulgan, 2006, p. 317) This observation certainly echoes my own experience working as an NGO lobbyist on issues such as trade and debt relief, captured in the expression 'they [decision makers] always say no, until they say yes.'

Drawing on in-depth case studies of seven examples of public policy change driven by citizen action, Gaventa and McGee (2010) arrive a number of 'propositions' on how such changes occur. These include some important points on the complex nature of successful citizen-state interaction: Civil society engagement in policy processes is not enough by itself to make change happen. Competition for formal political power is also central, creating new impetus for reform and bringing key allies into positions of influence, often in synergy with collective action from below. Moreover, alliances between social actors and champions of change inside the state are critical to make policy change happen. Social mobilisation structures provide opportunities for state-based reformers to generate change from within, just as political opportunity structures provide spaces for social actors to do so from without.

These findings echo the views of Cox (1981) discussed in section 2, that any attempt to distinguish between such highly symbiotic actors as citizens and states is misleading, and it is better to consider 'state/society complexes' as the unit of analysis.

How do effective states promote active citizenship?

Gaventa and McGee (2010) emphasize that the feedback loops between states and citizens flow in both directions – states also promote citizenship (Gaventa and McGee, 2010, p. 15). Tarrow (1998) also sees a symbiosis between citizen and state action in European history. In the late 18th/early 19th Century, expanding states made war and built roads and to fund both, needed to extract taxes from the growing urban

world of industry and commerce. 'These efforts at state building were not intended to support mobilisation – quite the contrary. But they provided means of communication through which opinion could be mobilized, created a class of men experienced in public affairs and led to financial exactions on citizens who were not always disposed to pay them'. (Tarrow, 1998, p. 58) Thus the seeds both of contention and of citizen action were sown.

The state sought to mobilize, but also control, citizens in three main areas - war, regulating food prices and supply and raising taxes - and all three led to contentious politics. Mann (1993) sees this penetration of the state into ever more corners of the life of the nation as unintentionally 'caging' and galvanizing citizens: (Mann, 1993, p. 250). As a result, 'classes flexed their growing muscles on politics instead of concentrating as traditionally on fighting other classes in civil society'. (Mann, 1993, p. 20)

In many developing countries, particularly those in Africa, the creation of nation states is still work in progress. Official state institutions coexist in uneasy inter-relationship with customary and local structures of authority, to the extent that in some countries, the state's reach outside the capital remains tenuous. One implication of Mann's analysis is that in such circumstances, citizenship is not likely to emerge, and if it does, its exercise is less likely to be directed to influencing the state, rather than other, non state actors. Weak states lead to weak citizenship and weak political interaction between them.

For Tarrow (1998), the consolidation of the state changed the targets of contentious politics from local/private actors, such as traders, to public/national institutions, such as parliaments and governments. In the process, contentious politics became less violent, and more recognized as a legitimate part of the system. The state both gave ground (e.g. universal suffrage) and strengthened its monopoly of violence (e.g. professionalized police forces) to forestall violent revolution. (Tarrow, 1998, p. 65)

For social movements, this symbiosis with the state is, to mix some metaphors, a 'double edged sword'. 'Social movements that are too alienated from institutions risk isolation and sectarianism; but those which collaborate too closely with institutions

and take up institutional routines can become imbued with their logic and values.’
(Tarrow, 1998, p. 208)

Tarrow sees the succession of such cycles, and the rise of state institutions, as leading to a long-term shift in the nature of the interaction: ‘Over the last 200 years, there has been a slow, ragged but inexorable civilizing trend in the nature of contention and in the state’s means of controlling it.’ Tarrow concludes quoting Zolberg (1972):

‘The power [of contentious politics] will at first be ferocious, uncontrolled and widely diffused, but ultimately ephemeral and institutionalised. It will disperse ‘like a floodtide which loosens up much of the soil but leaves alluvial deposits in its wake’ (quoted in Tarrow, 1998, p. 210)

Do these conclusions hold in today’s developing countries? Whether because insufficient time has elapsed since their independence, or through academic oversight, the literature offers few answers to the question. While developmental states such as South Korea or Taiwan seem to be following the European trajectory and moving to a less contentious and productive coexistence between citizens and states, neopatrimonial states in Africa and elsewhere seem stuck in a less constructive equilibrium. In this latter group, states are often captured by small elites (sometimes even individuals) and used for surplus extraction.

6. Conclusion

This review has highlighted a number of areas where a deeper engagement with the literature can test and improve the arguments in the works under review, and points to some future directions for research.

It has identified some strengths in the works under review. Despite their overlaps and blurred boundaries, the basic framework of ‘active citizens and effective states’ has withstood scrutiny and continues to provide a useful entry point, both for discussing citizenship and state formation separately and then crucially, for exploring their interaction.

The framework's endogeneity has helped in understanding the internal dynamics and evolution of political, social and economic development in many contexts, without denying the importance of exogenous forces in constraining how those endogenous processes play out.

The review has also highlighted some apparent gaps and weaknesses in the literature, notably the reliance of much of the work on the history of citizenship on the particular experiences of Western Europe and North America. For example, there is a need to understand the extent to which citizen-state interaction in developing countries is following the path of institutionalisation and pacification seen in the West.

It has also drawn attention to the flimsiness of the discussion of the 'democratic developmental state'. There is a need better to understand how such states emerge, the balance between shocks and conscious agency in their emergence, and the extent and changing nature of any trade-offs between democratisation and economic dynamism.

Finally, the literature has little to say about the extent or importance of 'peacetime' active citizenship in non-democratic contexts, for example rural protest movements in China and Vietnam, or women's rights movements in Islamic societies. Nor do we have a clear picture of how these resemble or differ from their counterparts in democratic societies. Research should explore how such movements engage with different tiers of the state, and with what results.

The review has also identified some weaknesses in the works under review that need to be addressed in my future research.

First, the focus on citizens and states errs too far on the side of political agency and underplays the importance of economic structures, in particular the role and power of economic elites. A rebalancing, acknowledging the role of markets and economic power, would strengthen the argument.

Second, there is an unresolved tension between individual and collective expressions of citizenship, illustrated in the ambivalent attitude to electoral democracy.

Third, while the division between citizens and states in general holds good, there is a need to understand the internal, granular nature of both citizens' movements and states, as well as explore the roles of mediators (individuals, organisations, media etc) that move in the interstices between states and citizens.

Fourth, there is a failure to explore the 'dark side' of power relationships *within* civil society, for example the way in which some citizens' movements work to exclude the poorest and most marginalized from access to markets or state benefits, or the way in which civil society can sometimes become the perpetrator of mass violence against poor people.

Fifth, the works, particularly *From Poverty to Power*, underplay the role of conflict and cycles of contention in the exercise of citizenship.

Sixth, and partly contradicting the claims to general validity of the ACES framework, the works' geographical roots (predominantly in Latin America and East Asia) raise doubts over their applicability to other contexts, such as Africa, where non-state forms of authority play a more prominent role, or India, where institutions such as the caste system play a determining role.

Seventh, in highlighting the primarily endogenous nature of development and using a simple division between global and local citizenship, the works underestimate the importance of their interaction. Global citizenship processes can both strengthen and undermine exercises of local and national citizenship, depending on their design.

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